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ABSTRACT 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were arguably one of the most feared, lethal and 
capable insurgent movements in the modern age.  Yet despite their strength and wealth, 
the Sri Lankan armed forces destroyed the LTTE with a conventional army in a series of 
pitched battles from 2007–2009.  This thesis argues that the destruction of the LTTE 
during the end-game of 2007–2009 was in part due to a loss of local legitimacy amongst 
the Sri Lankan Tamils that the movement purported to represent.  This loss of local 
legitimacy was a product of LTTE coercion, facilitated by the enormous funding 
structures of the global Tamil Diaspora.  As long as the Diaspora was able to provide not 
only funding but political legitimacy to the movement internationally, and the LTTE was 
able to control political space locally, this loss of legitimacy was largely irrelevant.  Yet 
the effects of 9/11, combined with a Sri Lankan military offensive, not only highlighted 
the degree to which local legitimacy had disintegrated, it also showed just how important 
local legitimacy can be to an insurgent movement should the conditions suddenly take a 
turn for the worse.  The loss of local legitimacy, and its importance to the LTTE during 
the end-game, is largely missing from most literature on the subject. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The country of Sri Lanka is largely comprised of two competing ethnic 
populations, Sinhalese and Tamil.  Both these populations derive their cultural roots from 
the greater Indian sub-continent.  However, over the past several centuries, these 
ethnicities have grown to develop their own societal norms and values.1  Within Sri 
Lanka, the Sinhalese population is the largest group, comprising over 70% of the 
population.  The majority of the Sri Lankan Sinhalese lives in the southern and western 
portions of the island.  Of particular importance to Sinhalese Sri Lankans is their 
Buddhist tradition.2  In the decades following independence from Great Britain, the 
mobilization of Sinhalese citizens through social structures within the Buddhist faith 
played a central role in the eventual marginalization of Sri Lankan Tamils, leading to 
radicalization and militarization of Tamil groups.3   
The Sri Lankan Tamil people represent approximately 12–14% of the population.  
Members of this ethnic group reside mainly in the northern and eastern portions of the 
country.  However, there is a small Sri Lankan Tamil community with large business 
holdings in Colombo.  Beginning in the 17th century, Western powers from Europe 
began to influence the area through trading and the establishment of schools and 
missions.  Eventually, the British Empire formally colonized the island in the 19th 
century.4  While still under control of the British Empire, the Tamil minority was at times 
disproportionately over-represented in the colonial administrative government along with 
                                                 
1 Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (Honolulu, HI: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1987), 28–9. 
2 “CIA—the World Factbook—Sri Lanka,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ce.html (accessed 24AUG2009).  See also, Clinton Fernandes and Damien Kingsbury, eds., 
Hot Spot: Asia and Oceana, 1st ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008). 
3 James Manor, “Organizational Weakness and the Rise of Sinhalese Buddhist Extremism,” in 
Accounting for Fundamentalisms, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), 770–784. 
4 E. F. C. Ludowyk, The Story of Ceylon (New York, NY: Roy Publishers Inc., 1962), 274. 
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the Christian/Westernized Sinhalese elite.5  As the colony of Ceylon began to gravitate 
toward independence, Sinhalese Sri Lankans attempted to adjust the political 
representation in the colonial government.  Examples of this are prevalent throughout the 
history of the Ceylon National Congress during early 20th century.  During this time, the 
Ceylon National Congress was formed from the Ceylonese Legislative Council, a 
colonial legislative body designed to assume greater degrees of political power locally.  
The debate over the methods to populate this body transformed over time in relation to 
the greater degrees of political power afforded to it.  At first, the Legislative Council 
enjoyed communal representation, which gave Sri Lankan Tamils greater degrees of 
representation.  However, in the later years, Sinhalese politicians began to clamor for 
territorial representation, leading to the Sri Lankan Sinhalese gaining greater degrees of 
political power.6 
In 1948, the country of Ceylon became a sovereign state when the British left 
South Asia.  The Ceylonese adopted a unitary system of government based on a 
democratic vote.  As a majority, the Sinhalese Buddhists asserted more power.  Thirty-
five years later, Ceylon, renamed Sri Lanka in 1972, became embroiled in an insurgent 
war.  By 1983, the perception of the majority of Tamil peoples was that Sri Lanka had 
become so overwhelmingly anti-Tamil that the minority population had two options: 
either escape, or affect the government through violence.  While this created a large 
Diaspora around the world, those remaining launched an insurgent war until May of 
2009, when the Sri Lankan government was able to militarily defeat Tamil insurgent 
forces, known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).7  Despite the fact that Sri 
Lanka is a developing nation, the insurgents maintained this war through resources that 
came to a large extent from external sources.  The aim of this thesis is to develop a 
                                                 
5 Nathan Katz, “Buddhism and Politics in Sri Lanka and Other Theravada Nations since 1945,” in 
Movements and Issues in World Religions: A Sourcebook on Developments since 1945, eds. Charles Wei-
hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York, Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), 157–
175. 
6 Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, 29–30. 
7 Selvarasa Pathmanathan, “TamilNet: 17.05.09 Dignity and Respect for our People is all we Ask,” 
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=29389 (accessed 21JUL2009). 
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greater understanding of the role the Diaspora has played in this war, and the relationship 
between those who left Sri Lanka and those who remained on the front lines. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT 
This thesis does not wish to detract from previously discussed reasons for the 
demise of the LTTE.  In fact, it will add to previous academic works in order to develop a 
more holistic understanding of the LTTE’s demise, and perhaps provide a specific case 
study for a particular typology of insurgent group.  This thesis proposes an approach to 
the topic of the LTTE end-game from a different perspective than has been discussed to 
date.  I suggest that the LTTE’s initial success in tapping the power of the post-1983 
Diaspora eventually sowed the seeds for its demise.  As such, this thesis poses the 
question: “From the perspective of an external resource mobilization structure, what were 
the long-term impacts of the Diaspora upon the end-game of the LTTE?”  In this thesis I 
will show a relationship between the economic and political support of the Tamil 
Diaspora and the legitimacy of the LTTE at the local level, that is, within the Sri Lankan 
Tamil communities of northern and eastern Sri Lanka.  The argument here is that as the 
Diaspora increased its support, the LTTE reduced its reliance on local Tamils for funding 
or justification of the campaign, reducing LTTE legitimacy locally among the Tamils. 
Legitimacy will be measured qualitatively in two forms.  The first is the level of 
coercion the LTTE leveraged upon the local Tamil communities in order to gain fighters 
throughout the span of the conflict.  Coercion is used in this case for several reasons.  
First, power holders who use coercive tactics are less inclined to consider legitimacy 
when exercising coercion over constituents.  This is because coercion is seen as a method 
that solely affects behavior.  This is considered easier and more direct than affecting the 
attitude of constituents through persuasion, and then allowing for independent behavior to 
form as a product of popular legitimacy.   Second, when power holders’ objectives are 
self preservation and advancement, as opposed to outward oriented, such as toward the 
grievances of a social group, they are more likely to use coercion as a means to achieve 
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ends.8  Furthermore, as coercion is applied to greater and greater degrees, there is a 
negative effect upon the individuals or groups receiving the coercion.  These groups or 
individuals generally attempt to leave the environments altogether, thereby forcing the 
coercing authority to apply more coercive tactics in order to force their targets to stay in 
place.9  Thus, by measuring the degree of coercion used by the LTTE we can begin to 
determine the level of legitimacy it had amongst local Tamils as well as determine 
whether its vision of Tamil Eelam, with an LTTE government, coincided with the values 
of the local population.   
The second qualitative measurement of legitimacy will be the support, or lack 
thereof, afforded to LTTE cadre by the local population once the SLAF began to wrest 
away political space during the offensive and subsequent end game of 2007–2009.  The 
type of support we will examine is the level of sanctuary provided to the LTTE from 
Tamil locals once the SLAF began to occupy LTTE-dominated territory.  As the Sri 
Lankan Armed forces’ offensive struck deeper into Tamil areas previously dominated by 
the LTTE, the LTTE cadre should have become increasingly harder to detect and destroy.  
During the insurgent end game, insurgencies such as the LTTE should be able to rejoin 
the civilian population and remain anonymous, according to insurgent and counter-
insurgent experts, such as Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate 
School.10  Yet, this anonymity is real only to the degree that the civilian population is 
willing to play along and not inform the SLAF of the whereabouts, or true identity, of 
LTTE cadre.  To a large degree, this willingness to play along, or protect the LTTE from 
detainment or death, hinges upon the popular perceptions of legitimacy toward the 
movement.11  Therefore, the final stage of the LTTE insurgency should give clues as to 
popular perceptions of LTTE legitimacy at the end of the conflict.  If the LTTE realize 
                                                 
8 Barbara Van Daan and David Van De, “Why People Resort to Coercion: The Role of Utility and 
Legitimacy,” European Journal of Social Psychology 37, no. 2 (2007), 276. 
9 John R. P. French Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” Studies in Social Power 
(1959), 150–167 (accessed 22MAR2010), 158. 
10 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (03, 2007), 321–367, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=24153028&site=ehost-live&scope=site, 
327–8, 333. 
11 Ibid., 328. 
 5
that they cannot hide amongst the population, or rely on the population for support, I 
argue that this is indicative of a lack of legitimacy between the Tamil people and the 
LTTE.  If, on the other hand, the LTTE feel that they could hide amongst the population 
and survive the SLAF offensive, it would indicate a high degree of legitimacy.  As such, 
a qualitative assessment of events within the LTTE end game of May 2009 should 
provide further insight to degrees of legitimacy. 
The Diaspora’s support, in either monetary or political terms, can be measured 
qualitatively both before and after the international response to violent non-state groups, 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).  I will provide a compilation of 
reports circulating in the international community estimating international interdiction of 
Diaspora monetary support.  Variance is provided in the form of international interdiction 
of LTTE external support structures, i.e., the Diaspora, before and after 9/11.  The 
significance of the Diaspora and its support structures will be expanded throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.  For present purposes, it is enough to state that the Tamil 
Diasporas’ wealth, position and influence within the international community allowed it 
to become influential when discussing LTTE activities on the ground in Sri Lanka.  
Interestingly enough, the evidence collected to date suggests that the greatest degree of 
multinational interdiction of Diaspora support structures and the SLAF offensive of 
2007–2009 happened nearly concurrently.  Whether this was done purposefully, or is a 
mere coincidence, remains to be seen.  
In order to define and describe the significance of Diaspora influence upon the 
LTTE, this thesis will also draw on several theories and works concerning external 
resource mobilization structures as they pertain to Social Movement Organizations.  By 
studying these theories, and then providing qualitative data in order to operationalize 
these theories, the true role and impact of the Diaspora will become clearer.  
Furthermore, by understanding the impact of external resource mobilization structures, it 
will become apparent why the end-game of the LTTE was so different than previous 
insurgent movements. 
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B. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 
The following background to the LTTE insurgency depicts a historical trend in 
the Sri Lankan government’s dealings with the Tamil minority population since the 
British left.  This trend began with an assertion of Sinhalese political power and 
concurrent marginalization of Tamil groups.  This marginalization continued and 
worsened, ending with devastating ethnic conflict facilitated in part by the Sinhalese-
dominated Sri Lankan government.  The effects of this trend are a Tamil Diaspora that 
escaped the country under extremely violent conditions.  This Diaspora not only blamed 
Colombo for the violence, but came to accept the LTTE as the protectors of Tamil 
interests in Sri Lanka. 
After Ceylon was granted independence from Britain, many Tamils and 
academics argued that the Sinhalese majority quickly asserted itself on the island and 
began to re-shape the political environment in its favor.  There were several reasons for 
this political assertion.  Some authors point to the Sinhalese as suffering from a “Double 
Minority Complex,” meaning that the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka actually considers 
itself a minority.  This is because it perceives that the 60+ million Tamils living in the 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu are part of the calculation.12  Others claim that the British 
rulers purposefully disempowered the Buddhist Sangha, or religious order, within the 
Sinhalese community in order to gain political advantage, and to facilitate the 
establishment of favored Christian institutions.  After independence, the Sangha then 
quickly began to mobilize the majority Sinhalese population, making up for lost time and 
correcting what they had believed to be the Western and/or Tamil-influenced social ills 
that had permeated under British rule.13 
Others also assert that the political structures of Sri Lanka, especially the 
structures that were created directly after independence, allowed for the Sangha to 
                                                 
12 “Census of Tamil Nadu—2001,” http://www.census.tn.nic.in/ (accessed 24AUG2009).   See also, 
Mark Schaller and A. M. N. D. Abeysinghe, “Geographical Frame of Reference and Dangerous Intergroup 
Attitudes: A Double-Minority Study in Sri Lanka," Political Psychology 27, no. 4, 615–631, 
http://search.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=21384970&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
13 Katz, Buddhism and Politics in Sri Lanka and Other Theravada Nations since 1945, 157–175. 
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mobilize the masses so easily.14  These academics point to such literary works as: the 
Buddhist Committee of Inquiry’s The Betrayal of Buddhism, and its effects on the 
elections of 1956; The Sinhala Only Act, which banned the Tamil language from official 
use; and the constitutional reforms of 1972, which recognized Sinhala as the official 
language of Sri Lanka and declared Buddhism as having a primary place over other 
religions, as just some examples of the manifestations of Sinhalese political mobilization, 
and the concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil populations during the first few 
decades of Sri Lankan statehood.15  In these early days of Sinhalese political 
mobilization, Tamils’ counter-actions involved political rallies and peaceful protests 
aimed at political re-integration within the Sri Lankan state.16  These non-violent 
measures were answered by Sinhalese rioting against the Sri Lankan Tamil populations, 
and additional political actions that heightened tensions.17 
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (or BC Pact) is one example of the Sri 
Lankan governments’ political reneging.  This agreement was signed in July of 1957 by 
then Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike (a Sinhalese), and the leader of the Tamil 
Federal Party, CJV Chelvanayakam, in response to a proposal in 1956 by a Sinhalese 
majority in Parliament making Sinhala the only official language of Ceylon.  The 
peaceful Tamil civil-disobedience measures following the proposal of the Sinhala Only 
Act exemplified two things.  First, it showed that even in the early days of Sri Lankan 
statehood, the robust Sinhalese majority in Parliament could create and pass legislation 
                                                 
14 Manor, Organizational Weakness and the Rise of Sinhalese Buddhist Extremism, 770–784. 
15 Stanley J. Tambiah, “Buddhism, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka,” in Fundamentalisms and the 
State, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
589–618.  See also, Katz, Buddhism and Politics in Sri Lanka and Other Theravada Nations since 1945, 
157–175.  See also, Niloufer Abeysuriya De Silva, “Anti-State Militant Mobilization, Sri Lanka 1965–
1991” (PhD dissertation in Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook), 132–5.  See also, 
Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 
20th Centuries (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 99–100.  See also David Little, 
Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 74–6. 
16 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, 90. 
17 James Manor, The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 285–287.  See also, Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and 
Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries.  See also, Tambiah, Buddhism, Politics, and Violence in Sri 
Lanka, 589–618.  See also, Manor, Organizational Weakness and the Rise of Sinhalese Buddhist 
Extremism, 770–784. 
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despite Tamil political parties’ opposition.  Second, Tamil civil disobedience measures 
outside Parliament allowed for Tamils to mobilize in defense of their perceived rights.  
This smaller-scale mobilization created structures and networks that groups would utilize 
later, during much larger ethnic conflicts.  However, the anti-Tamil ethnic rioting by 
Sinhalese mobs, which ensued as a product of Tamil mobilization and peaceful civil 
disobedience, created a sense amongst some Tamils that the Sinhalese community writ 
large was antithetical to Tamil expectations and values.18   
Consequently, the BC Pact was seen by both Tamils, and a select number of 
Sinhalese politicians (led by Prime Minister Bandaranaike), as legislation that might 
mitigate Tamil opposition to the Sinhala Only Act.  Among other measures, the BC Pact 
recognized Tamil as a minority language, equal in stature and recognition as Sinhala, 
within the Tamil regions of the north and east.  This pact also set the stage for devolution of 
some political power to Tamil districts.  However, despite several unofficial agreements 
and promises to implement the BC Pact between successive Sinhalese dominated 
governments and the Tamil political parties, the BC Pact was never put into action.19  In 
fact, the initial abrogation of this agreement, which was announced in 1958, sparked off 
ethnic riots.  These riots highlighted not only the political sensitivity of ethnic equality, but 
also indicated an increasing degree of polarization between Sinhalese and Tamil groups.20  
However, because of the need to appease the Sinhalese majority, who were being 
mobilized by religious factions, Sinhalese politicians perceived that enacting any 
legislation with the intention of addressing Tamil parity was equivalent to political suicide.  
Consequently, in the short term it made more political sense for them to outperform each 
other by stressing more pro-Sinhalese/anti-Tamil legislation in order to get elected.21  As 
                                                 
18 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, 83–5.  See also, De Silva, Anti-State Militant Mobilization, Sri Lanka 1965–1991, 138.  See 
also, Stanley J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 597–9. 
19 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, 82–95.  See also, Manor, The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon, 286. 
20 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, 89.  See also, Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 597–9. 
21 Manor, Organizational Weakness and the Rise of Sinhalese Buddhist Extremism, 774.  See also, 
Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 97–8. 
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more such legislation was passed in the Sri Lankan Parliament, which was answered by 
Tamil protests, more anti-Tamil sentiments emerged amongst the Sinhalese. 
The riots of 1956 and 1958 are mentioned above; however, several others occurred in 
1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, and in 1981.22  Furthermore, a large body of evidence suggests that 
over time, Sri Lankan government forces instigated, participated in, or allowed these riots to 
take place.  For example, riots in 1977 occurred after the Tamil United Liberation Front had 
won an overwhelming majority of Tamil votes based on a campaign pledge to achieve a 
separate state of Tamil Eelam within the federal structure.  The TULF further articulated this 
stance by publishing what is known as the Vaddukoddai Resolution.  Despite their stated 
intention to create a separate Tamil state, the TULF at the time was still willing to achieve its 
desired ends peacefully and institutionally.23  The ensuing violence, perpetrated in part by Sri 
Lankan police, was officially blamed on the victims by the presidentially appointed 
investigator.24  This claim by the investigator validated and condoned the ethnically charged 
violence exacted upon the Tamil victims by Sinhalese mobs who were being led in part by 
Sri Lankan police.   
In 1979, the Sinhalese majority in Parliament, under the leadership of President 
Jayawardene, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in response to the fledgling (and 
not universally accepted) Tamil separatist movement that was slowly emerging  in the 
Tamil-dominated north.25  The Act allowed the police and military broad powers of arrest 
and detainment without trial or evidence.  Reports indicate that indiscriminate 
                                                 
22 De Silva, Anti-State Militant Mobilization, Sri Lanka 1965–1991, 158. 
23 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, 109–110. 
24 De Silva, Anti-State Militant Mobilization, Sri Lanka 1965–1991, 159.  See also, Wilson, Sri 
Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 125.  See also, 
Sarath Munasinghe, A Soldier’s Version: An Account of the On-Going Conflict and the Origin of Terrorism 
in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Market Information Systems Ltd., 2000), 8–10.  See also, Aziz Abu-
Hamad and others, “Playing the Communal Card”: Communal Violence and Human Rights (New York: 
Human Rights Watch,[1APR1995]), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/communal/ (accessed 
18MAR2010).  See also, Rebecca Knuth, Destroying A Symbol: Checkered History of Sri Lanka’s Jaffna 
Public Library. (Seoul: International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions,[27JUN2006]), 
http://archive.ifla.org/IV/ifla72/papers/119-Knuth-en.pdf (accessed 17MAR2010). 
25 Thomas A. Marks, “At the Front Lines of the GWOT: State Response to Terrorism in Sri Lanka,” 
The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International 10, no. 3 (2004). 
 10
incarceration and torture ensued.26  The Act was intended to coerce this fledgling 
insurgent movement into demobilization yet, in reality, had the opposite effect.27  
Furthermore, this Act allowed for police to conduct extra-judicial killings in response to 
attacks against police officers.  These killings facilitated the next series of ethnic riots in 
1981.  Although the riots were caused by several factors, one stands out in particular.  
While responding to crowd violence during election campaign rallies in Tamil dominated 
areas, several Sinhalese police officers were killed.  In retribution, police and Sinhalese 
groups throughout Sri Lanka went on a rampage, not only killing innocent Tamils and 
burning homes, but allegedly attempting to destroy Tamil heritage sites by burning the 
public library in Jaffna, which included original, and thereby irreplaceable, Tamil 
manuscripts.28  In a surprising note of candor, the Sri Lankan president fully admitted 
that members of his own party had instigated some of the violence committed against 
Tamils during these riots.29   
The history of the political relationship between the two communities in the post-
colonial phase shows a growing trend where Sinhalese political mobilization and ethnic 
empowerment at the ballot box led to a concurrent disenfranchisement of the Tamil 
population in Sri Lanka.  Further, attempts over time to resolve the divisiveness by 
existing Tamil political groups was seen by many Tamils as futile.  Tamil civil 
disobedience, peaceful in its intentions yet deadly in its outcome, was the result.  The 
violent response by the state to the exercising of Tamil rights within Sri Lankan 
democracy further alienated many ethnic Tamils.  This created a small but tight-knit 
youth movement that became convinced of militancy, and separation from the state, as 
the only way to protect Tamils.  Above all, clearly, the Sri Lankan government agents 
had, over time, become more involved in the riots.  This solidified the perception among 
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Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 125. 
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more and more Tamils that the Sri Lankan state was not only disingenuous, but overtly 
violent toward Tamils.30  The largest and most damaging riot came in 1983, which 
signaled not only the apex of anti-Tamil ethnic violence to date, but radicalized many 
Tamils against the Sri Lankan state.  Furthermore, the international Tamil Diaspora, 
which grew because of the increasing violence and disenfranchisement, became a main 
player in supporting the insurgency. 
The riots of 1983, described by one scholar as an “Orgy of Violence,”31 were 
implemented and organized by Sri Lankan state authorities.32  This is similar to previous 
rioting to date, yet far greater in scale.  Most accounts describe the riots as a Sinhalese 
reaction to the death of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, who were killed in an ambush in northern 
Sri Lanka by the fledgling Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).33  From July 24–
August 5, Sinhalese mobs attacked and destroyed Tamil businesses, killed Tamils and 
burned homes.  The reported death toll varies widely dependent upon the source, with 
numbers anywhere from 350–2000 killed.  Despite their origin in Colombo, the riots 
eventually spread to as far as Trincomolee.  Sinhalese mobs reportedly had voter 
registration lists with complete addresses of Tamils’ residences, businesses and numbers 
of family members.  Allegedly, members of the government provided these lists to the 
organized mobs.  Another important detail of these riots was the active participation of 
the Sri Lankan armed forces and military.  There are numerous reports that members of 
the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and police not only directed the riots but actively 
participated in them.34  The after effects of the riots were also devastating.  The number 
of refugees was estimated at 80,000–100,000 in the Colombo area alone.  The formation 
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of camps to house the refugees created long-term suffering as these Tamils had nowhere 
to turn because their entire livelihoods had been destroyed.   
As a direct result of these atrocities committed against Tamils throughout Sri 
Lanka, a large number fled the island, and established themselves in India, Australia, 
Canada, the United States, the UK and many other Western European countries.  In fact, 
according to some estimates, approximately one-quarter of all Sri Lankan Tamils 
currently live abroad.35  This equates to approximately 600,000–800,000 Sri Lankan 
Tamils spread throughout over 40 different countries, with the largest concentrations in 
Canada and the UK.36  In Toronto alone, the Tamil population is larger than the Tamil 
population in any city within Sri Lanka.37  Although the history of ethnic rioting in post-
independence Sri Lanka began as a series of legislative measures that the Tamil 
community perceived to be antithetical to Tamil interests, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan 
government reactions to Tamil grievances eventually sparked widespread violence that 
physically and emotionally destroyed Tamil communities.  Arguably, the Diaspora has 
never forgotten this tragedy.  Since 1983, Tamil Diaspora living in Western countries has 
become a political and economic force.  Estimates indicate that, in recent years, the 
Diaspora raised and supplied 200–300 million USD annually to the Tamil insurgency.38  
As of 2000, these funds provided the LTTE with over 80% of its annual budget.39  
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During the insurgency, the Diaspora funds allowed the LTTE to acquire high-tech 
weaponry and were allegedly used to curry political favor from Western politicians.40 
Several important inferences can be made in reference to the background of the 
Sri Lankan conflict.  First, the Diasporas’ last real memory was the widespread violence 
exacted upon them by the Sinhalese, and a Sri Lankan government that was, at best, 
incapable of stopping the violence or, at worst, contributing in the activity.  Second, 
Tamil political organizations did not initially envision the idea of a separate state.  
Instead, they desired greater inclusion and enfranchisement in the early days of Sri 
Lanka.  However, as a product of the aforementioned actions, the voices calling for the 
formation of Tamil Eelam espoused in the body of the militant Tamil youth organizations 
became louder than the ones calling for peaceful reconciliation.  Of course, the activities 
of the Sri Lankan government perpetuated this shift.  Yet, that does not mean that 
moderate voices were not available, they simply were drowned out by the sounds of 
Sinhalese mobs and the cries for war and revenge by Tamil youth.41  Interestingly 
enough, the perception of the conditions surrounding the plight of so many within the 
Diaspora allowed for the LTTE to continually rely upon Diaspora support, not only 
monetarily, but for political assistance as well.  At the time of the 1983 riots, the LTTE 
had suddenly become the “avenging saviors” of disaffected Tamils. 
Immediately following the 1983 riots, the LTTE had no problem finding recruits, 
as many Tamils who did not flee with the Diaspora volunteered after witnessing the 
atrocities committed against them.42  With notable exceptions, a combination of LTTE 
“salesmanship,” coupled with the geographic separation of the Diaspora from everyday 
events in northern Sri Lanka, has allowed this perception largely to remain within the 
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Diaspora, facilitating the continual flow of funding and political support.43  This 
Diaspora left behind family members and a homeland embroiled in civil war, fought 
between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and many small Tamil 
insurgent groups.  Arguably the most famous of which, and eventually the largest, was 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
After the IPKF pullout in 1990, the LTTE developed into a fearsome insurgency.  
Using the funding provided by the Diaspora, they rose in number and notoriety.  They 
controlled large areas in northern Sri Lanka.44  Subsequent operations by the Sri Lankan 
military during the 1990s and early 2000s were typically met with disaster as the LTTE 
continually outmaneuvered them on land, sea and air.  Mullaitivu provides an example of 
such clashes in which the LTTE showed an upper hand.  In the Battle of Unceasing 
Waves, the LTTE force of approximately 3000–4000 overran a Sri Lankan Army Brigade 
camp, which was supported by 122 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars.  The result was at 
least 1520 Sri Lankan military dead; with the artillery and heavy mortars captured.45  The 
LTTE is also credited with the development and implementation of the individually-
carried suicide vest, which they used to target not only political opponents such as Rajiv 
Gandhi and Sri Lankan Presidents Premadasa and Kumaratunga, but also other Tamil 
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resistance groups.46  The technology and explosives required to develop such intricate 
operations and deadly devices derive from the Diaspora’s funding structures. 
Yet despite their successes and wealth, the LTTE eventually came to an end.  In 
May of 2009, after a two-and-a-half year military offensive, the Sri Lankan Armed 
Forces surrounded the last of the insurgents as they attempted a desperate last stand, 
ironically enough, on the beaches in Mullaitivu.  The LTTE was once a unit of over 
10,000 battle-hardened guerillas.  However, the remnants that attempted this act of 
desperation consisted of many conscripted young children, who held civilians as human 
shields.  Meanwhile, their core leadership made desperate calls from their makeshift 
bunkers for American or British protection upon surrender.  Arguably, they were only a 
shell of what was once considered to be one of the most feared insurgent movements of 
the modern age.47  This last stand resulted in the death and capture of the last of the 
holdouts.  As proof of the insurgency’s demise, a photo of LTTE leader Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran was released, with a bullet hole in his forehead.48  Selvarasa Pathmanathan, 
the head of the LTTE’s international diplomatic relations committee, released the 
following statement: “we have already announced to the world our position to silence our 
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guns to save our people.”49  With that statement, the Tamil Tigers admitted to a military 
defeat and the longest running war in South Asia came to an end.50   
In the wake of this unprecedented Sri Lankan military victory over the Tamil Tigers, 
the explanation as to how and why the LTTE, after nearly 26 years of guerilla warfare, 
allowed itself to reach such an untenable position remain ambiguous.  Academicians assert a 
host of reasons.  They range from the restructuring and refurbishment of the Sri Lankan 
Armed Forces; to Sri Lankan diplomatic outreach to Western countries’ governments, as well 
as India; to the co-option of a key LTTE leader in 2004, Colonel Karuna, thereby facilitating 
the pacification of the eastern portion of the island; to the post-9/11 collective international 
change in perception toward any non-state group that strives for political aims through 
violence, be they Islamic fundamentalists or Tamil separatists.51  Furthermore, Colombo now 
offers a training program for foreign armies to learn new counter-insurgency lessons—
products from the Sri Lankan Army and their experience against the LTTE.52 
As stated previously, this thesis does not detract from the aforementioned reasons for 
the demise of the LTTE.  Instead, it offers a more holistic understanding by analyzing the 
role of the Diaspora throughout the conflict.  As such, the remainder of this thesis is divided 
into the following sections.  Chapter II examines existing research behind insurgent and 
counterinsurgent theory.  In addition, it also analyzes resource mobilization structures and 
their role in insurgent development.  Chapter III operationalizes these theories as they pertain 
to the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka.  Chapter IV explains the significance of 9/11’s 
aftereffects upon this insurgency.  Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis by illustrating the 
role of the Tamil Diaspora, as analyzed through the realization of theories behind a social 
movements’ dependencies upon external resource mobilization structures. 
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II. THEORIES AND MODELS OF COIN (COUNTER 
INSURGENCY) AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY 
As part of their work, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts, Leites and Wolf define the relationship between resources that are used to 
facilitate an insurgent movement.  This relationship is described in terms of its sources, 
endogenous or exogenous, and insurgent techniques in obtaining these inputs, defined as 
coercion and persuasion.  Here, Leities and Wolf use the relationship between these 
sources and techniques to describe how an insurgency acts as a system, and how the 
insurgent uses these inputs to create outputs, which allow the insurgency to grow in size 
and capability.53  The relationship between coercion and persuasion is particularly useful.  
Lietes and Wolf assert that coercive practices are beneficial to generating necessary 
inputs, as well as protecting the insurgency from state security forces, provided that 
certain conditions are met.  The first is that popular perceptions of coercive practices 
must be predictable.  Second, the population must believe that the force using coercion is 
omniscient and omnipotent.  Third, non-compliance must be more painful on the 
population than the sacrifice involved for complying.  And fourth, the more coercion that 
is used by the insurgent, the greater the requirement for constant vigilance on the part of 
the coercer.54  If the insurgent can adhere to these principles while applying coercion, 
they can continue to tax constituents and develop in size and strength to the point where 
they can eventually overcome the powers of the state, and achieve their political ends.  
Although Lietes and Wolfs’ theoretical arguments provide insight into insurgency 
growth, a further analysis of insurgent and COIN theory will provide greater 
understanding in order to form a baseline to compare to the LTTE insurgency. 
In his work, How the Weak Win Wars, Ivan Arrequin-Toft argues that an 
insurgent force’s victory is implied for “weak actors” that use “indirect strategies” against 
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strong actors who use “direct strategies” to defeat the weak actor.55  Arrequin-Toft 
defines direct and indirect strategies as follows:  
Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy 
that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an 
adversary’s will to fight: Toward this end, a GWS [Guerilla War Strategy] 
targets enemy soldiers, and barbarism [products of direct action strategies] 
targets enemy noncombatants.56 
Arrequin-Toft goes on to argue that by adopting an indirect strategy, the weak 
actor can defeat the strong actor, provided the strong actor uses a direct strategy.  This is 
because the tactics used by strong actors, or the state, who incorporate direct strategies 
will tend to target non-combatants in an effort to destroy the insurgent and, hence, 
galvanize the remainder of the population against the strong actor.  Of course, Arrequin-
Toft also states that this trend will continue as long as the weak actor, or the insurgent, 
retains access to sanctuary and social support.57  Yet research provided by McCormick et 
al. provides further resolution on just how an insurgency can grow to a point where it 
does ultimately defeat a strong actor, not just outlast a strong actors’ political will, as 
Arrequin-Toft suggests.  In this sense, McCormick adds to the Lietes and Wolf model of 
insurgent growth by describing the process of insurgent growth in further detail.  In his 
work, Things Come Together; Symbolic Violence and Guerilla Mobilization, McCormick 
and Giordano define the mobilization process of an insurgency.  Here, as a combination 
of the impacts of the Arrequin-Toft direct/indirect strategy, combined with an astute 
manipulation or balance of rational actor models, popular perceptions and resource 
control, insurgencies can grow to a point where they reach the “insurrection point,” and 
are capable of taking on the state and winning in direct confrontation.58  However, 
McCormick and Giordano admit that this balance is difficult to achieve and, because of 
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this, most insurgencies do not last.59  To clarify this process of dissolution, McCormick et 
al. go on to describe the insurgent end game in their work Things Fall Apart, The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars.  In this work, McCormick et al. describe in detail 
how both the state and the insurgency lose internal conflicts.  The inspiration for this 
work was to describe what the end game looks like, both for insurgent groups and state 
agencies, within the context of “internal wars”60 of which an insurgent movement is a 
part; and to describe these scenarios in order to glean useful information.  While defining 
the insurgent loss, McCormick describes what is termed the “insurgent break point.”  
Here, the state has reduced the size and capability of the insurgency to the degree that the 
insurgent is no longer capable of “posing an organized threat.”61  The insurgency loses to 
this degree, yet, according to McCormick: “they can simply return to the civilian 
landscape at will and live to fight another day.”62  As such, insurgent movements become 
harder to defeat as state agencies further attrite insurgent numbers.  This is because there 
are fewer of them to find, which requires a greater resilience and increased presence on 
behalf of the state as the end game draws nearer for the insurgent. 
As stated previously, the intention of this thesis is to add to existing research in an 
effort to come to a conclusion about the demise of the LTTE.  The LTTE did not fade 
into the local background as the state closed in.  Instead, they held a desperate last stand 
on an isolated beach and, at gunpoint, attempted to use the Tamil civilians that they 
purported to represent as human shields.  In the end, the LTTE were destroyed to the last 
in this manner.  This contradicts the gradual decline of the insurgent end game as 
described by McCormick.  The reasons for this contradiction are argued below.  The 
LTTE came to rely on increasing amounts of coercion in order to continue recouping for 
battlefield losses in fighting cadre.  What are arguably absent from the aforementioned 
arguments are the overall interpretations of increased levels of coercion by insurgent 
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groups upon constituents in order to garner support for the movement.  In other words, if 
an insurgency such as the LTTE has to rely upon increasing levels of coercion, what does 
that mean in relation to the populations’ perception of legitimacy toward the insurgency?  
As previously mentioned, forces that use increased levels of coercion generally are not 
interested in identifying themselves with constituents, thereby indicating reduced popular 
perceptions of legitimacy.  However, the short answer, according to these theorists, is that 
the meaning of increased coercion may not matter, provided certain conditions are met.   
Yet, in a departure from previous scholarship, I assert that if those conditions 
suddenly do change, this degraded level of legitimacy matters a great deal.  Furthermore, 
lost legitimacy, which suddenly became so important, will not be quickly restored.  In 
addition, the greater the degree to which the insurgency has been relying on increased 
coercion in order to generate inputs from constituents, the greater the loss of legitimacy 
that will be incurred.  And to the degree that this loss of legitimacy has been incurred, the 
greater the importance this loss of legitimacy will become if the environmental situation 
suddenly changes.  For example, if the population perceives that punishment for non-
compliance no longer outweighs the benefits for compliance, due to the insurgents’ 
control over political space having been suddenly wrested away.  Or, if the population 
has the perception that the insurgency no longer is able to carry out said punishment.  In 
such circumstances, the insurgent will have to immediately rely upon legitimacy in order 
to continue receiving the necessary inputs for protecting itself and carrying out further 
operations. 
In relation to the endogenous and exogenous sources of inputs, Leites and Wolf 
assume that the sources providing these inputs have complete goal alignment.  What if 
they do not?  As mentioned earlier, the specific case of the LTTE highlights that much of 
the needed support came from the Diaspora, living outside the political space that the 
LTTE controlled.  Although the historical record clearly states that before 1983 this was 
not the case; the two different sources that came into being are personnel from the Sri 
Lankan Tamil populations that reside within the political space controlled by the LTTE, 
and nearly everything else gained from outside the country.  The question then remains: 
what is the effect upon an organization that relies upon this type of support network?  To 
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give a brief preview of things to come, resource mobilization theory suggests that when 
such a disparity exists between endogenous and exogenous sources, the movement in 
question will be naturally drawn to, and become goal aligned with, the source providing 
the greater share of resources.63 
In their work, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald discuss a series of hypotheses that describe the 
role and impacts of a varying range of resource mobilization structures upon social 
movement organizations (SMO).  Within their work, several of their hypotheses not only 
apply to the LTTE case study, they also assist in filling the aforementioned gaps in the 
existing research concerning insurgencies.  The first hypothesis states: 
An SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents 
to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence 
solidarity incentives is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict…  
If a SMO favors one over the other it risks legitimacy with the group that 
falls out of favor.64 
In order to better understand this hypothesis, a clear definition of terms is 
warranted.  Here, “conscience constituents” are supporters of a social movement 
organization, in this case the LTTE, but do not directly benefit from the LTTE 
accomplishing its stated goal of Tamil Eelam.  This is due to the fact that they are 
removed from the situation at hand.  This situation describes the Tamil Diaspora 
perfectly, as they are living in various Western countries, yet their goal is for a separatist 
state in a third country, to which they have ethnic and familial ties.  “Beneficiary 
constituents,” on the other hand, stand to “benefit” from the LTTE accomplishing its 
stated goal, meaning that they will directly experience the impacts.65  Here, the 
beneficiary constituents represent the Sri Lankan Tamil citizens living in LTTE-
controlled areas.  Despite the funding and international political support coming from 
outside the country, it is the local Tamils who will eventually be subjected to Tamil 
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Eelam, which will be run by the LTTE.  According to Zald and McCarthy, when a social 
movement organization, such as the LTTE, attempts to link the two constituents in an 
attempt at solidarity, or to align interests, there is a high degree of tension.  Hence, the 
SMO inevitably favors one over the other.  Consequently, when this happens, the SMO 
loses legitimacy with the constituent that falls out of favor.  Here an important distinction 
is made.  Unlike the previously mentioned research conducted on insurgent movements, 
Zald and McCarthy do not assume that the endogenous and exogenous sources of 
necessary insurgent inputs have aligned interests.  This hypothesis then attempts to 
explain what happens when the two structures’ interests bifurcate.  Inevitably, the SMO 
must choose one over the other at risk to its perception of legitimacy with the disaffected 
group.   
The next hypothesis attempts to determine just what source is to be favored.  Here 
Zald and McCarthy assert: “The more dependent an SMO is upon isolated constituents, 
the greater the share of its resources that will be allocated to advertising.”66  Zald and 
McCarthy raise an interesting point.  Considering that isolated constituents do not exist 
within the political space controlled by the insurgent, a greater amount of outreach is 
needed in order to elicit maximum support.  The term “advertising” by the authors is an 
ambiguous term, yet some references can be made for the sake of describing the LTTE 
and its true motivations behind its interests or goals.  The term advertising has been 
defined in this thesis as the activities that the LTTE has over time conducted to stabilize 
and/or increase the funding lines or structures.  Therefore, by determining the degree of 
advertising, one can then ascertain what support structure, internal or external, is favored 
by the insurgent.  By determining this, one can further conclude where the insurgency 
risks a loss of legitimacy, from the individuals within the controlled political space, or 
outside this political space.  This loss of legitimacy can then be applied both before and 
after the SLAF offensive of 2007–2009 and the effects of 9/11 upon the Diasporas’ 
resource mobilization structures. 
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III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENT DEFINED AND 
OPERATIONALIZED 
In this section, I define the theoretical argument and operationalize the theories on 
resource mobilization structures in order to develop a clearer understanding of the 
LTTE’s demise.  Also, by providing empirical evidence, I validate claims made in this 
thesis, and answer our aforementioned research question on the role played, and the 
effect facilitated, by the Tamil Diaspora’s external resource mobilization structures upon 
the LTTE from 2007–2009.  First, I will illustrate a greater degree of goal alignment 
between the LTTE and the Diaspora, vis a vis the LTTE and the local Tamil 
communities.  In accordance with Zald and McCarthy’s arguments, this will show a 
greater LTTE attraction toward the Tamil Diaspora, and a greater distancing of the LTTE 
from the local Tamil communities.  Second, I will show an increased level of coercion 
exacted upon Tamil communities living in Sri Lanka by the LTTE, in order to garner 
necessary inputs for the insurgency.  Furthermore, there also will be proof of bifurcated 
interests between the Diaspora/LTTE, and the Sri Lankan Tamil communities that live 
within LTTE-controlled areas.  This will corroborate that as the LTTE became more 
famous internationally, among the Tamil Diaspora, they became more infamous 
domestically, amongst a greater number of local Sri Lankan Tamils.  The increase of 
these factors and occurrences from 1983 illustrate a parallel decrease in legitimacy for the 
LTTE, thereby facilitating the cataclysmic crash of the organization in 2009. 
A. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE DIASPORA AND LTTE COERCIVE 
PRACTICES 
The Tamil Diaspora began largely as a by-product of the 1983 riots.  At this 
time, perceptions of the LTTE as a fighting unit, capable of besting the Sri Lankan 
state, were high.  The faith in LTTE capabilities combines with a general displeasure 
amongst the Tamil Diaspora toward the Sri Lankan state, and served as the foundation 
for Diaspora/LTTE connectivity.67  Initially, however, the Diaspora was not significant.  
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As a result, the LTTE had to rely upon internal sources in order to fund its campaign.  
This was largely conducted by robbing the state banks that were in the local area.  By 
robbing these banks, the LTTE gained funding for their operations in the early days, 
and gained notoriety by attacking the state systems that had disenfranchised Tamil 
populations.  As a result, Sri Lankan (and largely Sinhalese) state agencies that were 
charged with bringing these bank robbers to justice discovered an uncooperative Tamil 
community.68  The capabilities of the LTTE in these early years were arguably limited.  
In 1983, for example, despite evidence of training in Tamil Nadu, the weapons of the 
LTTE consisted of small arms; rifles, pistols and shotguns.69  But once the Diaspora 
became a force unto itself, the external resources began to pour in.  In fact: “by 1991, 
the LTTE is said to have been supported by about 90% of the Tamil expatriate 
community.”70  In addition: “by 1991, the LTTE had established around 30 overseas 
offices manned by full time activists and helpers.”71  Coincidentally, it was also during 
this time that the LTTE began to establish its territory.  After the IPKF debacle of 
1987–1990 precipitated a complete unilateral pullout of Indian forces, the LTTE 
quickly filled the void of state absence, especially in the north and northeastern areas.72  
Separate state functions were set up to collect donations for the cause, as well as to 
process the volunteers who came to join the LTTE.  In fact, during these early days, the 
LTTE had little trouble finding recruits; neither is there evidence of the LTTE 
coercively pressing Tamils into service.  In addition, the LTTE began to brutally 
execute rival Tamil separatist groups as well as alleged Tamil traitors to the cause.  As 
a result, the LTTE declared itself to be the sole representative of the Tamil people to 
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the Diaspora, as it had eliminated all rivals.  It also established a reputation as a brutal 
organization; a threat to anyone who dared to disagree with its cause.73 
B. INDICATORS OF LOST LEGITIMACY—THE INCREASE OF LTTE 
INTEGRATION WITH THE DIASPORA AND DOMESTIC COERCION 
By 1998, the LTTE was able to collect approximately 24–36 million USD from 
the Tamil Diaspora, and this increased annually.74  In 2000, it was estimated that the 
Diaspora provided 80% of the LTTE annual operating budget, which in turn was 
estimated at 82 million USD.75  In a later report dated 2007, the estimated revenue 
provided to the LTTE by the Diaspora was 200–300 million USD annually.  An 
estiimated 30–40% of weapons were coming from the Diaspora funding structures and 
external sources, either set up, or controlled, by the LTTE.76  This represents an increase 
over time from virtually no capability in 1983, to an output of 200–300 million USD 
annually by 2007.  In order to ensure that this funding was maintained and gradually 
increased, LTTE ties to the Diaspora were further developed.  I am relating the term ties 
not only with advertising, in accordance with Zald and McCarthy’s theory of external 
resource mobilization structures, but also with interconnectivity.  Identifying greater ties 
to these resource mobilization structures indicates that the LTTE identified more with 
these structures than they did with local Sri Lankan Tamils. 
Although there is evidence that some members of the Tamil Diaspora were coerced 
into providing funds, political space was not controlled and hence fund raising was in part 
subject to local law enforcement.  To the degree that the LTTE could control political 
space, they could rely upon extortion and coercion to extract funding and other necessary 
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resources.  In large areas of northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s rule was uncontested by the 
SLAF.  However, on the streets of Toronto, London and Paris, LTTE fund raisers had to 
restrain overtly coercive practices for fear of interdiction by local police.  Therefore, it can 
be concluded that advertising campaigns were used to a greater degree in order to persuade 
the Tamil Diaspora to provide funds.  Reports indicate that as the Diaspora formed and 
organized, Tamils began to form community associations abroad.  The LTTE quickly 
began to co-opt these organizations.77  An example of LTTE connectivity with the 
Diaspora was the alleged infiltration of LTTE agents into the immigration agencies of 
Diaspora countries.78  If a Tamil wanted to gain access to the Diaspora, he or she had to go 
through the LTTE in order to do so.  This undoubtedly came at a cost.  The LTTE also 
began to develop front organizations globally in order to siphon funds.  In fact: “the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in 2000 that at least eight non-
profit organizations and five companies were operating in Canada as fronts for the 
LTTE.”79  The LTTE has used many methods to infuse itself to the Tamil Diaspora.  
Beginning in the 1990s, the LTTE front offices overseas began to use computer files to 
track and encourage monthly donations from people within the Diaspora.   
As of 1998, the LTTE had information and procurement offices in at least 54 
countries.80  As technology developed, this eventually evolved into automatic deposits on 
a monthly basis from bank accounts.  Beginning around 2005, these front offices began 
using PINs in order to track individuals and donation information.  The information on 
these PINs was sent to LTTE offices in Sri Lanka.  This established a central information 
base for when members of the Diaspora went visiting family members in LTTE-
controlled territory.  These individuals were also “taxed” the equivalent of 1 
USD/CDN/Euro, per day, that the individual in the Diaspora had spent away from the 
country.  Upon arrival, the Diaspora member surrendered his passport or personal 
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information to the local LTTE office.  The LTTE office would access the information 
stored in the database to determine the tax owed.  Subsequently, the Diaspora member 
would not be permitted to leave the area until this tax was paid.81  Additionally, the 
LTTE co-opted Hindu temples in many Diaspora countries, thereby controlling 
information through existing social structures and resources.82 
Information flows were controlled as well.  Dissenting opinions to LTTE were 
considered as antithetical to LTTE objectives, and were therefore subdued.83  Meanwhile, 
the LTTE began to set up information venues.  These included the Tamil Television 
Network, Tamilnet.com and various postings on shared media sites such as 
YouTube.com.  These sites, or the imbedded information therein, are considered by many 
to be the propaganda of the LTTE.84  Therefore, while there were virtually no links 
between the LTTE and the Diaspora in 1983, by at least 2007, there were several 
connections that gave the Diaspora access to information on the situation in Sri Lanka.  
Furthermore, since these links were allegedly controlled by the LTTE, the information 
provided to the Diaspora was in complete support of LTTE goals and activities.  Because 
of this, many members of the Tamil Diaspora openly and genuinely supported the LTTE.  
Even the contentious Human Rights watch report on LTTE coercion within the Diaspora 
admits:  
Many [Tamils in the Diaspora] are active supporters of the LTTE, and 
perceive the Tigers as an important and effective representative of the 
Tamil people and their interests.  They believe in the LTTE military 
struggle for independence in the North and East and willingly provide 
financial support for ‘the cause.’85 
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Evidence of open support and attempts to appeal to foreign governments on 
behalf of the LTTE are present as well.  In the United States, the LTTE continually relied 
on the generous donations from individuals who gave willingly: “out of belief that the 
efforts of the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy and security for the Sri Lankan 
Tamil Diaspora.”86  The overt support that the Diaspora displays was extreme at times.  
In February 2009, a British Tamil doused himself in gasoline and lit himself on fire in 
front of the United Nations in Geneva.  The individual left behind a note, which read in 
part: “The flames over my body will be a torch to guide you through the liberation path.”  
In fact, this individual was one of seven Diaspora Tamils in the month of February 2009 
to have done this.  Another Tamil in London tried the same thing, but he was arrested 
before he could actually light himself on fire.87  From the evidence provided above, we 
can see a definite trend.  As the Diaspora grew in size and funding capability, the LTTE 
grew its global tentacles in order to co-opt these funding lines.  Over time, whether 
through coercion, advertising, or information campaigns, the goals and objectives of the 
Diaspora and the LTTE became one.  This was certainly not true for all Tamils living in 
the Diaspora.  However, a recent report of Diaspora structures suggests that the majority 
of Tamils within the Diaspora not only supports the LTTE, but a separate Tamil Eelam as 
well.  And they are willing to continue to support the struggle even after the destruction 
of the LTTE.  Such aspirations have become antithetical to the desires of local Sri Lankan 
Tamils living in northeastern Sri Lanka.88  Perhaps the statement is a little “tongue in 
cheek.”  However, this sentiment among the Diaspora may have prompted Velupillai 
Prabhkaran, the now-deceased leader of the LTTE, to admit to the press in a rare 2002 
interview that: “his followers would not allow him to renounce this demand [for 
independent Tamil Eelam] even if he wanted to.”89 
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As the Diaspora and the LTTE became more intertwined abroad, LTTE 
recruitment locally became more coercive.  This coercion did not happen overnight.  Yet 
reports indicate that over time the LTTE went from having to vet potential candidates 
from a pool of willing Tamils in the late 80s and early 90s, to having to entrap Tamils in 
controlled areas.90  In the mid–1990s, “social entrapments” were used to impress fighting 
cadre.  A Tamil would be asked to serve in the LTTE civil service; yet, after reporting for 
work, it was discovered that the LTTE had released information to the Sri Lankan 
government of the individuals’ affiliation with the LTTE.  This act had the effect of 
virtual imprisonment, as the individual risked incarceration should they ever leave the 
LTTE-controlled territory again.91  By 2006, the families were required to provide one 
member per household to join the movement.  In the later stages of the conflict, this 
coercion became more pronounced.  In fact, one study of LTTE coercion within 
controlled areas concluded that the LTTE believed that: “what the entrapment 
mechanisms imply is that attitudinal support [amongst the population] for the rebels no 
longer is necessary, and that attitudinal support and behavioral support can be 
separated.”92  Attitudinal support is synonymous with popular legitimacy, or the popular 
identification with LTTE objectives.  Behavioral support is simply the act of compliance, 
regardless of any popular identification with the cause. 
As the situation progressed in northern Sri Lanka, the coercion became more 
pronounced.  In 2002, LTTE groups in eastern Sri Lanka were reported to have forcibly 
abducted children for fighting cadre.  If the parents attempted to resist the abduction, they 
risked having property taken away or incarceration.93  By 2007, the LTTE had declared 
that all Tamil families had to give up more than one child to serve as fighters.  Further 
reports in 1998 include rape being used against individuals not wishing to serve.  They 
also include LTTE commanders being bribed by wealthy or influential Tamils to not 
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impress certain children; and LTTE cadres forcibly impressing children, by physically 
pulling them from school or homes to serve.94  Toward the end in 2009, the LTTE 
increased its coercion.  On 17 March 2009, the LTTE were reported to have shot the 
parents of a child that they were trying to forcibly recruit; the LTTE then shot the child.  
“This incident sparked violent protests by the civilians, who forced the [LTTE] cadres to 
retreat.”95  Furthermore, in order to protect themselves and perhaps have informational 
ammunition to feed to the Diaspora, the LTTE cadres forcibly held Tamil civilians in the 
battle zone, presumably to be used as human shields.  By forcing the Tamil civilians to 
stay, the LTTE hoped that these civilians would become collateral damage incurred by 
the SLAF offensive.  Stories like this give the LTTE leverage over the Diaspora to attract 
more funding and support. On 13 February 2009, for example:  
US Embassy Colombo received a report from a foreign government that 
the LTTE killed 60 civilians who were fleeing by boat at night.  According 
to reports received by an organization, the LTTE then promised to arrest 
and detain, rather than shoot, those who sought to escape in the future in 
order to ease tensions between the LTTE and the civilian population.96   
The reports of LTTE forcible coercion measures to impress fighting cadres, and 
killing of civilians who wished to leave the fighting in 2009 are too numerous to recite in 
this thesis.  Yet, a clear trend exists where the LTTE moved from an organization that 
exhibited high standards, and had a robust group of volunteers, to an organization that 
committed human rights abuses to replenish its ranks with children in an attempt to 
survive.  Consider also that there isn’t any indication that the SLAF had changed its 
tactics in order to control the amount of collateral damage inflicted on Tamils from the 
time of the initial 1983 riots to the LTTE end game of 2009.  The U.S. Department of 
State Report to Congress entails a long and extensive list of intentional SLAF targeting of 
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Tamil civilians during the end game of 2009.97  In 1983, these same abuses by the SLAF 
once pushed the Tamil civilian populations to the LTTE recruiters’ doorstep.98  Yet by 
2009, the LTTE had to gradually increase its coercive practices in order to get cadre.  
This is a clear indicator of an insurgency that lost local legitimacy. 
By looking at the growing trends in LTTE practices and its increasing reliance on 
the Diaspora, we can see a loss of local legitimacy for the LTTE.  The three necessary 
inputs for an insurgency to grow and achieve political goals are “people, guns and 
money.”99  As such, the LTTE, like any other insurgency, is left with the problem of 
collecting and processing these necessary inputs.  And as the level of Diaspora funding 
grew in size, the LTTE ties to it increased in order to accumulate resource flows, or 
necessary inputs, to provide for the movement.  As these ties to the Diaspora increased, 
the LTTE reliance on local communities for money, guns and legitimacy decreased.  This 
leaves people as the only necessary commodity left domestically.  And as the LTTE 
reliance on the local communities for everything except people decreased, ties to local 
grievances decreased.  As the LTTE became less tied to local grievances, they relied on 
greater degrees of coercion in order to garner human capital to fill LTTE ranks, leading to 
spiral of decreased legitimacy.  This relationship is circular, and forms what has been 
referred to as a “reinforcing causal loop.”100  In this relationship, the situation 
progressively gets worse or better, depending on perspective, but not indefinitely.  
Eventually, the situation will deteriorate or the system will wear out until such a time 
when a plateau is reached and a reversal begins.101  I assert that while the aforementioned 
trend exists, increased LTTE coercion and loss of resonance within local Tamil 
communities is acceptable as long as the Diaspora continue to maintain such a significant 
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flow of resources, and the LTTE is able to control political space, thereby allowing for 
coercive practices to be effective.  However, once these two necessities begin to unravel, 
they undermine the reinforcing causal loop, and the system will crash as local legitimacy 
is no longer ensured. 
C. BIFURCATION OF INTERESTS AND GOALS: THE LTTE/DIASPORA 
VS. LOCAL TAMIL CIVILIANS OF NORTHERN AND EASTERN SRI 
LANKA 
Once firmly in power after 1990, the LTTE had little to gain from realizing 
reintegration in the Sri Lankan government and much to gain economically and 
politically from the struggle to gain an independent Tamil Eelam.102  Yet, it was not clear 
that the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils, still living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, 
shared this dream of an LTTE-controlled independent Tamil state.  This can be seen in 
the actions that the LTTE took while governing their own political space for about 20 
years.103  As described above, the LTTE’s ties to local grievances over time separated 
from those of the Sri Lankan Tamil’s within the LTTE-controlled areas, as indicated by 
the increasing reliance on coercion within LTTE political space to affect behavior.  
Further evidence will continue to illustrate this trend. 
In 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami killed about 37,000 people in Sri Lanka, 
mostly in LTTE areas.  Destruction from the Tsunami was not only limited to Tamil lives 
but of local infrastructure and livelihood as well.104  International aid in the form of NGO 
support was readily available to the LTTE to be used to alleviate human suffering.  Yet 
instead of allowing these organizations to administer the aid directly, the LTTE refused 
aid from any individual or group that did not funnel all donations through the Tamil 
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Relief Organization, which was an LTTE-controlled NGO. 105  There are even reports 
that the Sri Lankan Army offered to donate drinking water to those affected, but the 
LTTE turned it away.106  Further reports indicate that the LTTE had entered into the IDP 
camps, created to care for survivors of the Tsunami, and forced the children into their 
fighting cadre ranks.107  An analysis of LTTE reactions to the Tsunami concluded: “The 
international response to the Tsunami presented a challenge to the LTTE.  The potential 
for an influx of international civil society organizations would threaten its preeminence 
and legitimacy as the guardians of the Tamil people.”108   
This notoriety as the sole guardians of the Tamil people was not intended for the 
benefit of local Tamil civilians affected by the Tsunami.  It was meant to affect the Tamil 
Diaspora, in order to continue to provide resources and political leverage in support of 
LTTE agendas.  Therefore, the LTTE could not afford to have outside groups assisting 
Sri Lankan Tamils.  These activities would completely undermine the ongoing theme of 
sole representatives and protectors that the LTTE had been presenting to the Tamil 
Diaspora.  In the mind of the LTTE, undermining the theme meant undermining the 
resource flows.  As such, the interests of the LTTE were to eliminate rivals and ensure 
the conflict continues in order to secure resources from the Tamil Diaspora, not to reflect 
local norms, values and address local grievances.  Allowing outside activity that would 
have cared for Sri Lankan Tamils after the Tsunami would have cost the LTTE money, 
and hence became antithetical to the LTTE agenda.109  Furthermore, since the LTTE 
controlled information both into and out of their territory, they could shape the suffering 
of Sri Lankan Tamils to meet their needs.  This opportunity resulted in increased resource 
flows to LTTE front organizations abroad. 
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The second piece of evidence deals with the Presidential elections of 2005.  Here 
the incumbent, President Wickremesinghe, ran against Mahinda Rajapaske, a hardliner, 
and advocate of the military solution to the conflict.  President Wickremesinghe, on the 
other hand, had been far more conciliatory toward the Sri Lankan Tamils, and their 
expectations for a better quality of life.  Reports on the issue suggest that President 
Wickremesinghe offered hope for Tamils and, concurrently, a challenge to the LTTE.  
This is because an extended peace process affects funding from the Diaspora.  War, 
however, allows the LTTE the legitimacy needed to appropriate more funding from the 
Diaspora.110  Tamil groups antithetical to the LTTE, and claiming to be the watchdogs 
for Tamil rights, also released reports indicating that although President Wickremesinghe 
was no angel when it came to Sri Lankan Tamils, he had a better track record than the 
campaign promises of Mahinda Rajapaske.  Thus, Wickremesinghe was seen as an 
opening to negotiations with the state.111  Officially, the LTTE stated that the election 
was a Sinhalese affair and that all Tamils in Sri Lanka are forbidden to vote.112  This 
restriction on Tamils highlights the LTTEs’ aversion to allowing Tamils freedom of 
movement in accordance to their own wishes.  Tamils who refused to accept the ultimate 
ascendency of the LTTE were forcibly denied the right to cast a ballot, and improve their 
position in life.  Furthermore, many argue that this restriction ensured the election of 
President Rajapaske, who, true to his word, executed the war to its final outcome just 
short of four years after the election.113 
In Chapter II, insurgent/counter-insurgent theorists argued that increased 
coercion, resulting in a loss of popular legitimacy at the local level, may not matter, 
provided certain conditions are met.  Yet, I asserted, that if those conditions suddenly do 
change, this degraded level of legitimacy will matter a great deal.  Furthermore, this loss 
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of legitimacy, which suddenly became so important, will not be quickly restored.  I 
further argued that to the degree which the insurgency has been relying on increased 
coercion in order to generate inputs from constituents, the greater the loss of legitimacy 
that will be incurred.  And to the degree that this loss of legitimacy has been incurred, the 
greater the importance this loss of legitimacy will become if the environmental situation 
suddenly changes.   
The qualitative analysis thus far has demonstrated that, from roughly 1983 up 
until the final end game of 2007–09, the LTTE could control its own political space and 
continually develop in strength through the use of coercion at the local level to gain 
recruits.  Furthermore, during this span, they continued to gain required inputs from the 
international community in the form of political legitimacy, weapons and money to 
continually fund and resource campaigns.  Yet what continued to result was an increasing 
dependence on the global Diaspora as well as an increasing loss of legitimacy at the local 
level.  What is needed now is an event that provides us with a variance to assist us in 
developing not only a relationship between the Diaspora resources and local legitimacy, 
but also provides us with a clearer picture of the cause for the organizations’ demise. 
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IV. THE CATACLYSMIC EVENT—9/11 
The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) ushered a change in U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy, and also a change in how international actors view and operate against 
all terrorist groups globally.114  However, this change did not happen overnight, nor is it 
complete.  It is an interdiction of degrees that reached an apex around 2006–2007.  In the 
end, the Diaspora was just as desperate to save the LTTE from annihilation as the LTTE 
was in being saved by them.  However, respective governments, after witnessing LTTE 
activities and feeling the effects of the 9/11 attacks, were no longer interested in helping 
any non-state group that engaged in terrorism.115  The following information is pieced 
together from a host of wide ranging sources in order to develop an understanding of the 
gradual interdiction of the Diaspora, both temporally and spatially. 
Before 9/11, only two countries declared the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO), India in 1992, and the United States in 1997.116  Rohan Gunaratna, 
in a report from 2000 states that: “Overall, the domestic and international response aimed 
at combating terrorist infrastructures, including financial networks has been weak or non-
existent.”117  For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE gained funding, political favor, 
held rallies, and enjoyed being viewed as a legitimate freedom movement.  This was due 
to the efforts of the Tamil Diaspora that saw the LTTE as an extension of their desires for 
justice in Sri Lanka.118  It was only after the events of 9/11 that other countries with large  
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Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora populations took any action against curtailing the fundraising 
activities of the group.119  However, once started, these activities increased in number.  In 
2001, Great Britain and Australia designated the LTTE as a FTO.120  The Patriot Act of 
2001 and subsequent Anti-Terrorist Financing Act affected the LTTE in the US, the UK 
and Canada.  Originally, this act did not label the LTTE as a terrorist organization.  
Consequently, funds were not tracked and frozen like the various Islamic terror groups 
the act had intentionally targeted.  However, in an effort to gain support for the Global 
War On Terrorism internationally, the United States added unrelated terrorist groups, and 
in October 2001 froze LTTE assets.121  Britain and Canada also began freezing LTTE 
assets in February and November of 2001, respectively.122 
In addition, many Tamils declined to provide funds to the LTTE for fear of legal 
action.123  Law enforcement authorities also began to mobilize and interdict various 
elements of the Tamil Diaspora and the associated LTTE foreign offices.  The LTTE 
occasionally used Tamil youth gangs in order to collect funds or deter Tamils antithetical 
to the cause.  In October 2001, Canadian Police arrested 40 Tamil gang members in a 
series of raids in Toronto.124  In 2003, the Thai authorities arrested and imprisoned three 
Tamil LTTE operatives attempting to buy weapons in Thailand.  This marked the first  
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time Thai authorities had interdicted Tamil weapons procurement in their country.125  In 
2005, the British Charity Commission delisted the TROs’ UK office as a charitable 
organization.126  In 2006, Canada proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, making it illegal to support or conduct fundraising on the groups’ 
behalf.127  In April 2006, the RCMP conducted a raid on the World Tamil Movement’s 
headquarters in Montreal.128  In the United States, a combined FBI/RCMP operation 
netted several LTTE-associated Tamils who were trying to bribe State Department 
officials, and purchase shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.129  In 2006, the EU 
proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.130  In 2007, Intelsat Ltd., a 
Washington D.C.-based company, banned the Tamil Television Network from using its 
system.  The network then moved to Paris, and began televising its LTTE propaganda 
again.  However, in May 2007, French authorities shut it down, under the new provisions 
of the FTO designation that the EU adopted the previous year.131 
In April 2007, the leader of the LTTEs’ office in Paris, and 13 others, were 
arrested on charges of “financing terrorism” and “criminal associations with a terrorist 
enterprise.”  The LTTE then sent a replacement to France, to oversee operations.  He was 
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in turn arrested in September 2007 by French authorities.132  In April 2007, Karunakaran 
Kandasamy, the head of the LTTE office in the United States was arrested by the FBI.  
Evidence collected from the arrest alluded to a front organization, the World Tamil 
Coordinating Committee having raised millions for the LTTE.133  In May of 2007, 
Australian authorities arrested two LTTE Tamils who were involved in a fraudulent 
campaign to collect money for Tsunami relief victims.  The relief organization was 
actually an LTTE front, and authorities seized over 520,000 USD in assets.134  In June 
2007, the president of the British Tamil Association, Arunachalam Chrishanthakumar, 
was arrested by British authorities, for violating laws under the British Terrorism Act.  A 
British court later froze all of his assets, worth four billion pounds sterling.135 
This list does not encompass all interdiction efforts.  There are hundreds of 
examples of international law enforcement crackdowns on LTTE and Diaspora 
funding structures.  The vast majority of them happened after 9/11, and the vast 
majority of these efforts occured only after 2006.  Interestingly enough, it is also 
during this time in Sri Lanka that President Rajapaske was preparing for an all-out 
final solution to the LTTE through military means.  Arguably, just when the LTTE 
needed them most, the Diaspora had been interdicted to the degree that it was 
unable to assist.  The culmination of this change of international attitudes was the 
Diasporas’ response when the annihilation of the LTTE seemed most imminent, and 
their respective governments’ response seemed aloof.  In several cities where the 
Diaspora lived, Tamil groups held rallies for their governments to intervene on 
behalf of the LTTE.  These rallies were received with deaf ears as most of these 
countries had already proscribed the LTTE a terrorist organization.136  Today, the 
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Tamil Diaspora has largely adopted new forms of pressuring not only their 
respective governments but the government of Sri Lanka as well.  These new forms 
are in the political arena.  However, the Diaspora still clings to its goal of an 
independent Tamil Eelam.  In reference to this persistent goal, the most recent 
International Crisis Group report states: “Even these activities are out of step with 
the wishes and needs of Tamils in Sri Lanka.”137 
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V. CONCLUSION 
There was a time in the history of Sri Lanka when the Army dared not enter the 
Wanni jungles for fear of being swallowed up by massed LTTE assaults, and the Navy 
dared not to encroach upon the territorial waters of the LTTE for fear of being attacked 
by swarms of fast-attack gunboats and suicide bombers.  Yet in the final hours of the life 
of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, he sat in all that was left of his once vast territory—a 
makeshift bunker on a stretch of lonely beach.  Surrounded by the same Sri Lankan 
forces that he used to attack with impunity, the Sri Lankan army to his front, the ocean 
and the Sri Lankan navy to his rear, and accompanied by what was left of his 
organization: mostly child soldiers and a few hundred civilians whom he had forced at 
gunpoint to join him.  In this surreal setting, one can almost hear Prabhakarans’ thoughts: 
“how in the world did it come to this….?” 
At the beginning of this thesis, I posed the following question: “from the 
perspective of an external resource mobilization structure, what were the long-term 
impacts of the Diaspora upon the end-game of the LTTE?”  This thesis has laid out 
evidence from a plethora of sources in order to answer this question.  I asserted that the 
capabilities of the Diaspora provided an exorbitant amount of funding and political 
legitimacy to the LTTE.  Furthermore, the goals of the Tamil Diaspora and the goals of 
local Sri Lankan Tamils, still living in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, bifurcated over 
time.  This bifurcation was a product of geographical separation from the conflict area, 
Diaspora ecology, LTTE co-option of Diaspora structures, and persistent information 
campaigns provided to the Diaspora from LTTE controlled media after the exodus from 
the homeland.  The LTTE then became more inexorably linked to the Diaspora than to 
Tamil grievances at the local level.  By increasing the linkages to the Diaspora, the LTTE 
risked the loss of legitimacy with the local Tamils.  As legitimacy was lost so was 
attitudinal support.  This loss in attitudinal support was then replaced by LTTE reliance 
upon coercion to ensure behavioral support of local Tamils.  The result was an ever-
increasing use of coercion locally in order to gain the amount of recruits necessary to 
continue operations in Sri Lanka.  As such, the LTTE became less concerned in actually 
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representing local Tamil interests and more concerned in selling the perception of being 
the sole representative of the Tamil struggle to the vast Diaspora.  Over time, it purported 
itself as the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and champion of Tamil 
Eelam not to win a war of succession, but to facilitate the continual flow of monetary 
support to its coffers.  The actual plight of local Tamils became less and less of a concern 
to the LTTE.   
However, with relative sovereignty achieved, meaning that the LTTE controlled 
its own political space (due in large part to the Diasporas’ funding and political 
relationships with Western governments), they were able to administrate over their own 
political space as they saw fit.  The effect of legitimacy loss was negligible.  If local 
behavior was antithetical to their struggle (for example, local reluctance to provide 
children for fighting cadre), they could simply increase the coercion and alter the 
behavior.  Local loss of legitimacy was a matter of degree, and not entirely complete.  
However, this loss of legitimacy became very important to the LTTE when their political 
environment changed.  Beginning in 2007, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces began to 
remove political space from the LTTE, and the entire system came crashing down.  The 
loss of legitimacy became instantly apparent as the LTTE could not simply “melt” into 
the social landscape of the Tamil peoples, many of whom no longer saw the LTTE as 
their saviors, but as usurpers.  The LTTE had one option left, coerce locals into helping 
the cause by providing fighters or stand in as human shields, fight the Sri Lankan Armed 
Forces as long as possible, and rely upon the Diaspora to come to their aid.  However, the 
events of 9/11 adversely affected the international communities’ perception of violent 
groups.  Thus, the desperate last stand on the isolated beach in Mullaitivu, the desperate 
calls for help to Western countries, the Diasporas’ parades and rallies to save what was 
left of their avenging angels, all resulting in the termination of the once feared Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.   
A. IMPACT ON FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis also provides a useful case study for a certain typology of insurgent 
organization.  I have argued that the LTTEs’ single greatest asset, the large external 
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resource mobilization structure embodied by the Tamil Diaspora, also proved to be a 
curse.  As such, we can learn valuable lessons from an insurgent typology that resembles 
this same funding source. 
This thesis essentially analyzes a case study, yet determines the effect of an 
external resource structure upon an insurgent group.  Arguably, the LTTE presented an 
extreme typology, where they had become almost entirely dependent upon the Diaspora.  
Because of their dependence on this external resource structure, as well as their firm 
control over areas of northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE may be representative of other 
movements that become unevenly dependent upon one source of inputs over another.  
What happened to the LTTE may therefore inadvertently happen to other insurgent 
groups with the same style support structure.  Insurgents who depend heavily upon 
outside support structures that are not goal aligned with local expectations and values in 
order to receive the necessary inputs for conducting insurgent operations will also be 
dependent on a high degree of control over their own political space.  Consequently, they 
may also be vulnerable to local losses of legitimacy.  Therefore, if both external resource 
structures were interdicted to a certain degree, and control over political space was 
wrested away, even temporarily, the insurgent movement would inevitably crash.  
Adversely, the opposite may also be true.  In this case, an insurgent movement that does 
not rely upon external resource structures may not be reliant upon control over political 
space.  Consequently, they may become tied to local expectations and values out of sheer 
necessity, and hence not susceptible to local losses of legitimacy.  Therefore, large 
conventional pitched battles to wrest away political space, coupled with attempts to 
interdict respective external resource structures will have no effect upon the insurgent 
organization.  To a degree, this lesson seems to be absent from many works that catalog 
the contributing factors of the LTTEs’ demise.  The most recent publication of Jane’s 





1) Generating political will on the part of Colombo and the Karuna split were 
decisive. 
2) Securing the Eastern Front first before attacking the north.  Largely done 
with the assistance of Karuna. 
3) Conducting tactically sound operations that destroyed LTTE defenses.  
The Sri Lankan Armed forces used conventional fire and maneuver, at 
times employing Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to soften LTTE 
positions. 
4) Newly professionalized and rapidly expanded force greatly outnumbered 
the LTTE. 
5) Securing the rear guard from LTTE attacks and infiltrating LTTE areas 
with special commando units. 
6) Creating a pocket with multiple coordinated division size attacks in order 
to safeguard against escape and channel the LTTE into one area. 
7) Diplomatic outreach to countries that historically had been friends to the 
LTTE, especially India.138 
I am not attempting to discount these conclusions.  The improvements made by 
the SLAF, as well as the political will of Colombo and its improved diplomatic outreach, 
certainly assisted in defeating the LTTE.  However, consider if the LTTE in this 
environment had retained a high degree of local legitimacy.  I argue that if this were the 
case, they simply would have vanished into the civilian landscape once the SLAF began 
their large conventional push.  Furthermore, the conventional fire and maneuver of the 
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SLAF would have only succeeded in inflaming local Tamils, who suffered greatly from 
the application of overwhelming SLAF firepower.  Finally, it is highly doubtful that any 
infiltration of SLAF commando units would have remained for long had the social 
conditions not been in their favor to a certain degree.  A civilian population that remained 
completely loyal to the LTTE would not have tolerated infiltration units trying to destroy 
their beloved Tigers in their backyards for very long.  Finally, the repressive actions of 
the Sri Lankan government toward the Tamil populations are well documented.  Without 
the detrimental effects of 9/11 upon the international community to supplement the Sri 
Lankan diplomatic missions, I argue that these efforts would not have been as successful.  
Finally, I assert that legitimacy matters.  Despite efforts to diminish legitimacy’s 
importance and replace it with the supremacy of behavioral support; a legitimate 
movement in the eyes of the local population pays countless benefits should the 
campaign suddenly and unexpectedly take a turn for the worse.  The final days of 
Prabhakaran and the LTTE provide an excellent example of the necessity of legitimacy, 
and what happens to movements that forget this lesson. 
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